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In this paper we ask whether the two-factor theory of delusions is 
compatible with two claims, that delusions are pathological and that 
delusions are adaptive. We concentrate on two recent and influential 
models of the two-factor theory: the one proposed by Max Coltheart, 
Peter Menzies and John Sutton (2010) and the one developed by Ryan 
McKay (2012). The models converge on the nature of Factor 1 but 
diverge about the nature of Factor 2. The differences between the two 
models are reflected in different accounts of the pathological and 
adaptive nature of delusions. We will explore such differences, 
considering naturalist and normativist accounts of the pathological 
and focusing on judgements of adaptiveness that are informed by the 
shear-pin hypothesis (McKay and Dennett 2009). After reaching our 
conclusions about the two models, we draw more general 
implications for the status of delusions within two-factor theories. Are 
there good grounds to claim that delusions are pathological? Are 
delusions ever adaptive? Can delusions be at the same time 
pathological and adaptive? 
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Delusions are symptoms of mental disorders. Does that mean that they 
inherit from disorders their pathological status? Or should they be seen 
instead as emergency responses to a critical situation and thus described as 
adaptive? Could they be simultaneously pathological and adaptive? In this 
paper we are interested in the answers that the two-factor theory of 
delusions provides to such questions.  
 
We are aware that delusions come in different forms and contents and that 
the two-factor theory has interesting things to say about all types of 
delusions—and other kinds of beliefs too. However, in this paper we shall 
refer to monothematic delusions and in particular the Capgras delusion as 
our standard example. This is for two reasons: (1) the two-factor theory 
was initially put forward to account for monothematic delusions,1 even 
though its scope has been gradually extended to account for a wider range 
of phenomena;2 (2) the Capgras delusion is the standard example in the 
papers proposing the two models of the two-factor theory we have chosen 
to focus on. 
 
1.1. Delusions: The Pathological and the Adaptive 
 
Delusions are unusual beliefs that are considered as symptomatic of a 
number of mental disorders, such as schizophrenia and delusional disorder. 
Monothematic delusions revolve around one theme and their content is 
often wildly implausible: someone with Capgras delusion believes that 
their spouse has been replaced by an impostor who looks just like the 
spouse; someone with Cotard delusion believes that they are disembodied 
or dead; someone with mirrored-self misidentification believes that they 
can see a stranger—and not their own image—in the mirror. The two-
factor theory of delusion formation is a very influential theory proposing 
that monothematic delusions are caused by at least two factors. Factor 1 is 
a neuropsychological deficit responsible for anomalous data that may also 
result in an anomalous experience. Factor 2 is a cognitive process 
(described as either dysfunctional or biased) explaining either the initial 
endorsement of the delusional belief or the prolonged maintenance of the 
delusional belief in the face of mounting counterevidence. Multiple 
versions of the two-factor theory have been put forward, where the main 
difference between them lies in the description of Factor 2 and its role in 
the process of delusion formation. 
 
1 Some authors suggest that the two-factor theory is best suited to account for monothematic delusions, 
and that has been built around the Capgras delusions (e.g., Corlett 2019). 
2 See for instance the discussion of self-deception in McKay et al. (2005). 
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According to the two-factor theory, are delusions pathological? Are they 
adaptive? Following the most popular ways to characterise what counts as 
a disorder in the philosophy of medicine in general and in psychiatry in 
particular, a belief counts as ‘pathological’ when it is either (1) the output 
of a dysfunctional process (naturalism); (2) harmful (normativism); or (3) 
the output of a dysfunctional process and harmful (harmful-dysfunction 
account) (Bortolotti 2020). Beliefs are sometimes regarded as pathological 
when they deviate from some norm to which they are expected to 
conform—but that use of the term ‘pathological’ is an extension and we 
shall not consider it here.  
 
Beliefs are usually called ‘adaptive’ if they enhance a person’s wellbeing, 
purpose in life, or good functioning (psychological adaptiveness); or if 
they enhance an individual’s chances of survival and reproduction 
(biological adaptiveness). It has been shown that arguments for the 
biological adaptiveness of delusions are less common and overall less 
persuasive than claims about their psychological adaptiveness (McKay and 
Dennett 2009; Lancellotta and Bortolotti 2019) and when some delusions 
are presented as psychologically adaptive, their contribution to wellbeing 
or good functioning is often regarded as partial or temporary. We will 
spend more time on the psychological adaptiveness claim simply because 
the biological adaptiveness thesis has been defended (to our knowledge) 
only within the predictive-processing account of delusion formation 
(Fineberg and Corlett 2016) and not within the two-factor theory. To make 
our task more manageable, we shall confine our attention to forms of 
psychological adaptiveness that are explained by a shear-pin mechanism 
(McKay and Dennett 2009). 
 
1.2. The Shear-pin Hypothesis 
 
According to the “shear-pin” hypothesis (McKay and Dennett 2009), some 
false beliefs that prevent a cognitive system from being overwhelmed can 
count as adaptive (adaptive misbeliefs). This might happen for instance 
when people experience such a traumatic event that they would succumb 
to suicidal thoughts if their negative emotions were not managed. One 
example is anosognosia (“denial of illness”), where a person, who has lost 
the use of a limb as a result of physical trauma, denies paralysis or does 
not acknowledge the full extent of the ensuing impairment (Ramachandran 
and Blakeslee 1998; McKay et al. 2005). Someone’s delusion that they can 
clap their hands when their right arm is paralysed would act as a motivated 
belief which serves to reduce the harmful impact of their new disability on 
their wellbeing and sense of self. McKay and Dennett (2009) suggest in 
their paper that, in situations of extreme stress, motivational influences are 
allowed to intervene in the process of belief evaluation. As a result, people 
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come to believe what they desire to be true (“My arm is not paralysed”; “I 
can clap!”) and not what they have evidence for (“My arm is not moving 
because it is paralysed”). This is designed to permit the cognitive system 
to continue operating. 
 
According to the shear-pin hypothesis, the situation in which adaptive 
misbeliefs emerge is already seriously compromised.  
 
What might count as a doxastic analogue of shear pin 
breakage? We envision doxastic shear pins as components of 
belief evaluation machinery that are “designed” to break in 
situations of extreme psychological stress (analogous to the 
mechanical overload that breaks a shear pin or the power surge 
that blows a fuse). Perhaps the normal function (both 
normatively and statistically construed) of such components 
would be to constrain the influence of motivational processes 
on belief formation. Breakage of such components, therefore, 
might permit the formation and maintenance of comforting 
misbeliefs – beliefs that would ordinarily be rejected as 
ungrounded, but that would facilitate the negotiation of 
overwhelming circumstances (perhaps by enabling the 
management of powerful negative emotions) and that would 
thus be adaptive in such extraordinary circumstances. (McKay 
and Dennett 2009, 501) 
 
The person is already experiencing high levels of stress and can come to 
more serious harm unless their negative emotions are managed. Thus, 
adaptive misbeliefs prevent the situation from worsening. McKay and 
Dennett talk about the “extraordinary circumstances” in which 
motivational influences on belief are not just tolerated but desirable. Such 
influences intervene not by accident but by design, and this is what makes 
the resulting beliefs adaptive despite their falsehood.  
 
McKay and Dennett consider the possibility that some delusions count as 
biologically adaptive misbeliefs but argue that in the case of delusions the 
extent to which desires are allowed to influence belief formation is 
excessive. They leave it open whether some delusions can count as 
psychologically adaptive. 
 
1.3. The Two-factor Theory 
 
According to Max Coltheart (2007), who is the founder of the two-factor 
theory, a satisfactory theory of delusions should be able to answer two 
questions about the genesis and maintenance of delusional beliefs:  
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1. Where does the delusion come from?  
2. Why is the delusion adopted and then maintained in the face of 
disconfirming evidence?  
 
Two-factor models of delusions provide an answer to these questions by 
advocating two factors in the generation and maintenance of a delusional 
belief (Coltheart 2007).  
 
Factor 1 answers the first question and results in anomalous data/experience. 
Consider for example the Capgras delusion where the person comes to 
believe that a loved one has been replaced by an identical impostor. Factor 
1 is an autonomic failure in the face recognition system, so when the person 
sees their spouse, the well-known face does not trigger the usual feelings 
of familiarity.3 This generates an anomalous experience of a face which is 
recognised but does not feel familiar. On the model, Factor 1 explains the 
content of the delusion. Factor 1 varies from delusion to delusion and may 
even vary across individual cases of the same delusion. Two-factor 
theories hold that Factor 1 is necessary but not sufficient to explain the 
phenomenon of delusions. This is mainly due to the fact that there seem to 
be people who have the deficit playing the Factor 1-role but do not report 
delusional beliefs. To differentiate these cases from delusional ones, 
another factor (Factor 2) is required to explain the transition from the data 
resulting in an anomalous experience to the delusional belief. The move 
from not feeling that a well-known face is familiar to believing something 
like: “The person I see in front of me is not my spouse but an impostor” is 
due to a process of either endorsement or explanation of the content of the 
anomalous experience.  
 
Whilst Factor 1 differs from one delusion (or person) to the next, Factor 2, 
broadly described as a problem in belief evaluation, is supposed to be 
constant across all delusions. However, two-factor theorists disagree on the 
precise nature of Factor 2. Some proposals identify Factor 2 with a lesion 
to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Coltheart et al. 2018) but there 
is disagreement about whether this locus is specific to delusions or shared 
with other neuropsychological conditions (see Tranel and Damasio 1994; 
Corlett 2019). Another open question about two-factor theories is whether 
Factor 2 contributes to the adoption or to the maintenance of the delusional 
belief.  
 
3 We are aware that the way of describing the conscious experience of people with Capgras when they 
look at their loved one is controversial, but we will not engage in questions about the nature of their 
experience as it is not relevant to our discussion. In this paper, we shall talk about their failing to 
experience a “feeling of familiarity”. Also, there is a debate about how to accurately characterise the 
content of the Capgras delusion. In this paper, we shall talk about people believing something like the 
following: “The person I see in front of me is not my beloved one but an impostor”. 
Eugenia Lancellotta and Lisa Bortolotti 
 42 
Let us describe two competing models of the two-factor theory—the most 
influential and detailed—and map their differences. 
 
1.4. The Coltheart Model 
 
On what we shall refer to as the Coltheart model (Coltheart et al. 2010), 
Factor 1 is a neuropsychological deficit which results in anomalous data 
and can manifest at conscious level as an anomalous experience.  
 
Factor 1 operates at the belief adoption stage. What happens at the belief 
adoption stage? The anomalous data are accounted for by a process of 
inference to the best explanation (abductive inference): given the very 
unusual nature of the data, the delusional explanation is the best possible 
explanation among a range of candidate hypotheses. Abductive inference 
is understood in Bayesian terms. Bayes’ theorem stipulates the best way of 
choosing among candidate hypotheses to explain a given piece of evidence 
(O). A hypothesis (H) is more apt than another hypothesis (H’) to explain 
O if its posterior probability is higher than the posterior probability of H’.  
The posterior probability of a hypothesis is the product of the hypothesis’ 
prior probability (the probability of the hypothesis before O) and its 
likelihood (how likely it is to observe O if the hypothesis was true). On this 
account, given O, it is possible for H to be a better explanation than H’ 
even if H has a low prior probability providing that the likelihood of H 
given O offsets its low prior probability.  
 
Consider the Capgras delusion. In the Coltheart model, the impostor 
hypothesis (“That woman is not my wife but an impostor”) can be a better 
explanation than the spouse hypothesis (“That woman is my wife”) with 
regard to evidence O. Even if the impostor hypothesis has a lower prior 
probability than the spouse hypothesis, as impostors are not a frequent 
occurrence, its likelihood can be much greater than that of the spouse 
hypothesis, to the point of making its posterior probability higher than that 
of the spouse hypothesis. In this scenario, the impostor hypothesis is the 
most rational explanation for the absence of a feeling of familiarity: people 
have intact reasoning capacities when adopting the delusional hypothesis. 
Their reasoning is compromised when evidence against the delusional 
belief start accumulating. 
 
Factor 2 is a cognitive deficit inhibiting the rejection of an endorsed belief 
even in the presence of strong counterevidence—Factor 2 makes the belief 
virtually impossible to revise. On this model, Factor 2 operates at the belief 
maintenance stage. What happens then, at the belief maintenance stage? 
On the Coltheart model, there is a second dysfunction responsible for the 
delusion (Factor 2) which amounts to a deficit in belief evaluation. This 
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allows the delusional belief to be preserved in the face of evidence to the 
contrary.  
 
In the case of Capgras delusion, the person faces overwhelming evidence 
against the impostor belief but that is not sufficient reason for the person 
to abandon or revise that belief. Evidence may include the testimony from 
relatives and friends confirming that the person accused to be an impostor 
is in fact the spouse. The person who adopted the delusional belief is 
unable to step back from it and to consider alternative explanations even 
when the belief receives serious challenges. 
 
1.5. The McKay Model 
 
Ryan McKay puts forward several objections to the Coltheart model which 
are important to understand his own proposal (McKay 2012), what we shall 
call the McKay model. As the objections are also relevant to our assessment 
of the status of delusions, we shall consider some of them here, albeit 
briefly.  
 
First, the novel contribution in the Coltheart model (Coltheart et al. 2010) 
is that adopting the delusional hypothesis (e.g., the impostor hypothesis in 
the Capgras delusion) is Bayesian-rational because the hypothesis is the 
best explanation for the anomalous data. But for McKay the rationality of 
the endorsement of the delusional hypothesis is overestimated in the 
Coltheart model, because the model does not take into account how 
incredibly unlikely the state of affairs which makes up the content of the 
delusion is. As McKay says, it would be akin to a miracle if an impostor 
were to take the place of one’s spouse and be also perfectly identical to the 
spouse. Thus, it is not plausible to suppose that there is nothing problematic 
in the reasoning step that leads from the anomalous data and the resulting 
experience to the delusional belief. 
 
Second, how do we account for the experiences of ventromedial frontal 
patients who, similarly to Capgras patients, experience an autonomic 
failure to familiar faces but who, differently from Capgras patients, do not 
adopt the impostor belief? In the Coltheart model, the assumption is that 
ventromedial frontal patients initially adopt the impostor belief—as the 
best possible explanation of the anomalous data which sometimes results 
in an anomalous experience—but do not maintain it. When faced with 
disconfirming evidence, differently from Capgras patients, they abandon 
the impostor belief. This can be accounted for if ventromedial frontal 
patients share Factor 1 with Capgras patients but not Factor 2.  
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McKay’s objection to this proposal is that it is implausible that 
ventromedial frontal patients first adopt the impostor belief and then reject 
it. It is implausible that the spouse hypothesis is dismissed at the stage of 
belief adoption but then embraced once the person receives evidence 
against the impostor belief. The conjunction of new evidence (i.e. 
testimony from relatives and friends which contradicts the impostor belief) 
and old evidence (i.e. the absence of a feeling of familiarity which confirms 
the imposter belief and protestations for the alleged impostors that they are 
not impostors) does not favour the spouse hypothesis over the impostor 
belief in the circumstances. Why would the spouse hypothesis explain the 
total evidence any better than the impostor belief? More precisely, it is not 
clear why the testimony of others should radically change the distribution 
of likelihoods between the impostor belief and the spouse hypothesis, 
considering that, according to McKay, the spouse’s testimony was 
presumably already dismissed at the stage of the adoption of the impostor 
belief.  
 
A possible response in defence of the Coltheart model is that the testimony 
of the spouse does not count as evidence in favour of the spouse 
hypothesis: it is easy to see that a good impostor would still convincingly 
pretend to be someone’s spouse even when explicitly confronted about it. 
The testimony of friends and family seems a more reliable source of 
evidence in favour of the spouse hypothesis. Hence, it might be the case 
that ventromedial frontal patients initially adopt the impostor belief 
because it is the one which best explains the evidence at hand—the absence 
of feelings of familiarity and the testimony of the spouse—but then 
correctly dismiss it in the face of the testimony of friends and family.  
 
The third criticism of the Coltheart model is probably the most compelling. 
It concerns the chronology of Factor 1 and Factor 2. If people with Capgras 
delusion are unable to revise their impostor belief in the light of 
contradicting evidence because of Factor 2, this means that they cannot 
acquire Factor 2 prior or at the same time of Factor 1, otherwise they would 
be unlikely to abandon the spouse hypothesis and would dismiss the 
evidence for the impostor hypothesis (i.e., the absence of a feeling of 
familiarity). In other words, if people who develop the Capgras delusion 
are conservative with their existing beliefs at the maintenance stage, why 
should they be revisionist with their existing beliefs at the adoption stage? 
The Coltheart model seems to require that people with Capgras acquire 
Factor 2 after Factor 1, that is, after endorsing the impostor belief and 
before facing the testimony of family and friends which counts against it.  
 
McKay overcomes this objection by putting forward his own model, 
according to which Factor 2 operates at the adoption stage, just like Factor 
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1: the impostor hypothesis is adopted because people suffer from a 
neuropsychological impairment responsible for the anomalous data and 
resulting in the anomalous experience (Factor 1), and because they have a 
bias towards explanatory adequacy (Factor 2) which leads them to accept 
hypotheses that seem to explain their experiences even when such 
hypotheses have low prior probability and conflict with their existing 
beliefs. 
 
An individual with a bias towards explanatory adequacy will 
update beliefs as if ignoring the relevant prior probabilities of 
the candidate hypotheses. (McKay 2012, 345) 
 
The McKay model builds on previous work by Stone and Young (1997), 
Aimola Davies and Davies (2009), and McKay himself. It largely agrees 
with the Coltheart model about the nature of Factor 1. Factor 1 is a 
neuropsychological deficit and in the case of Capgras delusion it causes 
the absence of a feeling of familiarity towards well-known faces.  
 
However, the model offers a different account of Factor 2. In the McKay 
model, Factor 2 is activated in the transition from the anomalous 
experience to the belief. Due to the explanatory adequacy bias, salient 
perceptual experience is taken at face value, causing the person to adopt a 
hypothesis which explains the experience in question but does not fit with 
the person’s previous beliefs (e.g., the impostor hypothesis in Capgras). 
Ventromedial frontal patients who may also fail to experience feelings of 
familiarity towards well-known faces (Factor 1) but who do not come up 
with the impostor belief may just lack the explanatory adequacy bias 
(Factor 2). In the model, Factor 2 is thus already present when the 
delusional belief is adopted whereas the Coltheart model is supposed to 
locate Factor 2 at the belief maintenance stage.  
 
For McKay, given the extreme low prior probability of the impostor 
hypothesis, it is not rational to adopt it as an explanation of the anomalous 
experience, so some bias needs to be involved in the acceptance of the 
delusional belief. The delusion is adopted due to the fact that people 
discount the prior probabilities of the delusional hypothesis in favour of 
how well the hypothesis explains (‘fits’) the data. So, people who develop 
Capgras adopt the impostor belief despite its low prior probability because 
it matches the absence of a feeling of familiarity towards well-known faces 
better than the spouse hypothesis. 
 
Here is a way of describing the difference between the McKay model and 
the Coltheart model: for McKay the delusion emerges when the impostor 
belief is adopted, as Factor 1 and Factor 2 have contributed by then to the 
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person endorsing an unusual explanation for an unusual experience. For 
Coltheart and colleagues, the impostor belief is adopted as a result of 
Factor 1, but it becomes a delusion only when it grows resistant to 
counterevidence at the maintenance stage as a result of Factor 2. 
 
1.6. Interim Summary and Plan 
 
We have introduced two models of the two-factor theory, explaining how 
they differ (see table 1 for a summary). In section 2 we shall ask whether 
the models are compatible with delusions being pathological. In section 3 





Factor 1 Factor 2 
The Coltheart 
Model 
(Coltheart et al. 
2010) 
A neuropsychological deficit 
manifesting in an unusual 
experience leads the person to 
adopt an unusual belief. 
A cognitive deficit in belief 
evaluation leads the person to 
preserve the unusual belief in 
the face of counterevidence. 





A neuropsychological deficit 
manifesting in an unusual 
experience contributes to the 
person adopting an unusual 
belief. 
An explanatory adequacy 
bias contributes to the person 
adopting a belief with low 
prior probability.  
Factor 1 and Factor 2 together explain the adoption of the 
delusional belief. 




2. Are Delusions Pathological? 
 
In this section we ask whether the claim that delusions are pathological 
beliefs is compatible with the two-factor models of delusions described in 
section 1, the Coltheart model and the McKay model. We structure the 
discussion around three ways in which we can understand what it means 
for delusions to be pathological, which map the notions of disorder 
defended in the philosophy of medicine: naturalism (the system is 
disordered if it is dysfunctional); normativism (the system is disordered if 
it causes harm); the harmful-dysfunction view (the system is disordered if 
it is dysfunctional and it causes harm). 
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2.1. The Naturalist View  
 
For naturalists, the pathological nature of a delusional belief depends on 
whether the belief’s aetiology involves a dysfunction. More precisely, the 
claim is that for a belief to be pathological, there must be a dysfunction in 
the mechanisms responsible for how the belief is adopted or maintained. 
 
In statements about the two-factor theory of delusion formation, the words 
‘deficit’ and ‘dysfunction’ are indeed used and delusions are recognised as 
pathological: “[W]e advocate a deficit model of delusion formation, that 
is, delusions arise when the normal cognitive system which people use to 
generate, evaluate, and then adopt beliefs is damaged” (Langdon and 
Coltheart 2000, 184). And again: “Essentially, we view delusion as a 
dysfunctional belief, a doxastic state of a particular pathological severity” 
(McKay et al. 2005, 315). We know by now that in the two-factor theory, 
the two factors are a neuropsychological deficit resulting in anomalous 
data/experience and, more relevant to assessing the pathology of a belief, 
a problem with reasoning. Factor 2 is described as a cognitive bias (e.g., 
Fine et al. 2007; Langdon et al. 2010; McKay 2012) or as a cognitive deficit 
(e.g., Coltheart 2007; Coltheart et al. 2010).4  
 
In two-factor theories advocating cognitive biases, people reporting 
delusional beliefs are found to reason differently from people who do not, 
but the difference is not a disadvantage independent of the context in which 
the bias operates. This suggests that there is no deficit or dysfunction 
involved in forming the delusion given the anomalous nature of the 
experience. The presence of biases in the belief fixation process is not 
sufficient for the resulting belief to qualify as pathological, and indeed 
many non-pathological beliefs are the output of biased reasoning. The 
same bias can be beneficial in some contexts and detrimental in other 
contexts, and biased reasoning does not imply the presence of an 
underlying deficit. The McKay model is a good example of the bias 
approach: the problem identified in the inference from the experience to 
the belief (Factor 2) is an explanatory adequacy bias. People who have it 
tend to disregard a hypothesis’s low prior probability if the hypothesis 
seems to explain well the data salient to them. The opposite tendency, often 
called doxastic conservatism, consists in resisting a hypothesis that does 
not fit with previous beliefs even if the hypothesis seems to explain well 
the data. It is a form of inertia where the person’s existing model of the 
world is protected from change. Whether one bias or the other leads to 
 
4 If the only problem with the delusion was the anomalous data it explains, then one might come to the 
conclusion that the delusional belief itself is not pathological as there is nothing dysfunctional in the 
way in which belief fixation mechanisms operate. 
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better outcomes (the adoption and maintenance of true and rational beliefs) 
depends on the context. Thus, on naturalist grounds alone, delusions are 
not pathological in the McKay model. 
 
In two-factor theories explicitly advocating a cognitive deficit or a doxastic 
dysfunction, Factor 2 is to be identified with such a deficit or dysfunction: 
examples would be the failure for the belief fixation system to inhibit 
implausible hypotheses or the failure for the belief maintenance system to 
abandon or revise a belief that has received disconfirmation by further 
evidence after its adoption. This suggests that the role of Factor 2 in the 
formation of delusions is sufficient for the delusion to count as 
pathological on naturalist grounds. The Coltheart model fits such a 
description: impostor beliefs may not be pathological when they are 
adopted, as the impostor hypothesis is the best explanation for the person’s 
anomalous data/experience. However, the belief becomes pathological at 
the stage in which it is maintained in the face of powerful counterevidence, 
because its maintenance is due to a dysfunction affecting belief evaluation. 
 
2.2.  The Normativist and the Harmful-dysfunction View  
 
Normativists agree that the pathological nature of a belief depends on 
whether the belief causes harm or otherwise leads to undesirable 
consequences for the agent—as judged by the agent or by society, 
depending on the preferred version of the view. Harms and disadvantages 
may include impaired functioning, loss of agency, negative emotions, 
failure to fulfil one’s goals, and so on. It is plausible to claim that delusions 
(differently from many non-delusional irrational beliefs) are generally 
disruptive and can negatively affect a person’s wellbeing causing impaired 
functioning, social isolation and withdrawal. 
 
However, for a belief to be pathological, we would expect the belief itself 
to be the cause of harms or other disadvantages. It is not clear in the case 
of delusion whether the belief is the cause of the harm or disadvantage or 
is instead a response to a situation that is already critical for the person. 
The difficulty for normativism here is that what we know about so-called 
pathological beliefs does not usually enable us to determine whether the 
harm or disadvantage is caused by the beliefs themselves. Indeed, it may 
be caused by something else but ultimately explain why the beliefs are 
adopted or maintained; or it may just happen alongside the adoption and 
the maintenance of the belief.  
 
For instance, on some accounts of delusions in schizophrenia, the delusion 
is seen as a response to the uncertainty in the prodromal phase of psychosis 
(e.g., Jaspers 1963; Mishara 2010). More relevant to monothematic 
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delusions, in anosognosia the adoption of the belief that one’s arm is not 
paralysed (say) can be seen as a reaction to the physical and psychological 
trauma the person experienced (e.g., Turnbull et al. 2014). In such a case, 
the delusion seems to be a response to a critical situation as opposed to the 
source of the harm or disadvantage (although the maintenance of the 
delusion may become a source of further harm or disadvantage). In the case 
of monothematic delusions like Capgras, it is not clear whether the 
delusion causes or is a response to harm or disadvantage: psychodynamic 
accounts of Capgras tended to see it as a motivated delusion, but more 
recent cognitive-deficit accounts do not make room for the delusion to be 
part of a defence mechanism (McKay et al. 2005). 
 
There are cases in which unquestionable harm or disadvantage is 
associated with believing the delusional content (e.g. when the content is 
distressing, causing guilt, fear, or anxiety). There are also cases in which 
the harm or disadvantage is caused by the reaction of the surrounding 
social environment to the person reporting the belief: individuals whose 
beliefs have similar surface features may experience drastically different 
responses, ranging from being supported by their social circle to being 
vulnerable to exclusion and isolation. In sum, there is a significant link 
between delusions and harm or disadvantage even when a person’s overall 
functioning is not impaired by the delusion (e.g., Jackson and Fulford 
1997).  
 
Where does this leave our two models? Are delusions pathological on 
normativist grounds for the two-factor theory? The most plausible answer 
is yes. McKay is explicit about delusions causing harm—functioning is 
disrupted by the extent of the mismatch between the content of the delusion 
and the reality as experienced by those who are non-delusional (McKay et 
al. 2005; McKay and Dennett 2009). Factor 1 and Factor 2 are both 
responsible for this mismatch, the data being anomalous and the delusional 
hypothesis being so implausible that it would be ‘miraculous’ for its 
content to turn out true. The Coltheart model does not explicitly discuss 
negative psychological consequences of the delusion but that delusions 
cause harm or disadvantage is often implied.  
 
On views of the pathological nature of delusions according to which both 
a harmfulness condition and a dysfunction condition are combined (the so-
called ‘harmful-dysfunction’ views inspired by the work of Jerome 
Wakefield), delusions still result as pathological on the Coltheart model 
but not on the McKay model unless Factor 2 is described as a cognitive 
dysfunction as opposed to a cognitive bias. 
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2.3. Summary of Section 2 
 
The two-factor theory aims at providing an account of the pathological 
nature of delusions, so it is not surprising that the claim that delusions are 
pathological is compatible with both the Coltheart model and the McKay 










(Coltheart et al. 
2010) 
The delusion is 
pathological 
because its 
maintenance is due 
to a cognitive 
dysfunction. 







The delusion is 
pathological 
because its 
maintenance is due 








The delusion is not 
pathological 
because it is due to 
a cognitive bias, 
not a cognitive 
dysfunction. 
The delusion is 
pathological 
because it disrupts 
psychological 
functioning. 
The delusion is not 
pathological 
because it disrupts 
psychological 
functioning but is 
not due to a 
cognitive 
dysfunction. 
Table 2: Are delusions pathological? 
 
 
3. Are Delusions Adaptive? 
 
In this section, we ask whether the claim that delusions are adaptive is 
compatible with the Coltheart model and the McKay model. In the 
philosophical, psychological, and psychiatric literature there have been 
recent explorations of the idea that some delusions may be adaptive in 
some sense (Lancellotta and Bortolotti 2019), psychologically (McKay and 
Dennett 2009), biologically (Fineberg and Corlett 2016), even 
epistemically (Bortolotti 2015; 2016).  
 
As anticipated, we shall focus on the shear-pin hypothesis as the best (most 
detailed) conceptualisation of adaptiveness as applied to delusional beliefs. 
The shear-pin metaphor illustrates one of the ways in which delusions 
could be considered as adaptive. By disabling some of its parts, shear pins 
allow a system which is about to collapse to continue operating, albeit in 
an imperfect manner. In shear-pin accounts, an adaptive misbelief is the 
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outcome of a process that is designed to prevent the collapse of the 
cognitive system. The misbelief is biologically adaptive if it enhances 
genetic fitness and psychologically adaptive if it contributes to wellbeing 
or good functioning. As we saw, after careful consideration, McKay and 
Dennett (2009) conclude that delusions are not biologically adaptive 
misbeliefs.5 However, they do not rule out that some delusions can be 
psychologically adaptive.  
 
Based on our analysis in section 2, both the Coltheart and the McKay 
models identify a factor responsible for anomalous data. In the Coltheart 
model the adoption of the belief is Bayesian-rational but its maintenance 
is due to a cognitive deficit; in the McKay model, the adoption of the 
delusion is due to a cognitive bias. Do such accounts leave room for 
delusions to be described as an adaptive emergency response? 
 
3.1. The Coltheart Model and the Shear-pin Hypothesis 
 
In the Coltheart model as applied to monothematic delusions such as 
Capgras, does the adoption of the unusual belief (1) emerge in the context 
of a crisis and (2) rescue the cognitive system from collapsing? As we saw, 
the unusual belief is an explanation—the best possible one—of the 
anomalous data brought about by Factor 1. When people lack feelings of 
familiarity towards a familiar face, the cognitive system produces a belief 
(“The woman in front of me is not my wife but is an impostor”) which is 
false, but Bayesian-rational. The adoption of the unusual belief can hardly 
be interpreted as the response to a critical situation, and there seem to be 
no reason to believe that it would be rescuing the cognitive system from 
collapsing. This strongly suggests that the adoption of the unusual belief is 
not the outcome of a shear-pin mechanism.  
 
Let’s move now to the Coltheart model of belief maintenance. Does 
preserving the unusual belief in the face of counterevidence (1) emerge in 
the context of a crisis and (2) rescue the cognitive system from collapsing? 
In a delusion like Capgras and in the context of a deep tension between 
what one believes and what other people believe, remaining convinced that 
one’s spouse has been replaced by an impostor could have some 
psychological benefits over believing that one has serious mental health 
 
5 Revisiting McKay and Dennett’s shear-pin hypothesis in the light of their predictive-coding approach, 
Sarah Fineberg and Phil Corlett (2016) argue that the breakage of the shear pin and the consequent 
formation of the delusion allow an individual’s cognitive system to keep functioning in the face of 
anomalous data. Such data, if left unexplained, would lead to the paralysis of the processes by which 
an individual engages in automated learning, significantly damaging the cognitive system. By 
explaining the anomalous data, the delusion allows automated learning to resume and the cognitive 
system to keep functioning. However, the cost is that all anomalous data are likely to be interpreted 
through the lens of the delusional belief which become more entrenched as the default explanation. 
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issues. Continuing to believe that one has veridical experiences and is the 
victim of a malicious third party (i.e., the impostor) would help preserve 
one’s positive self-image, whereas acknowledging that one’s experience is 
unreliable and gave rise to an implausible belief would not. In the light of 
this, Factor 2 could be interpreted as the sign that the shear pin has broken. 
If the goal is to salvage the cognitive system at the cost of disabling some 
of its parts, Factor 2 could be understood as the cost—the disabling of the 
capacity for belief evaluation.  
 
However, the compatibility of the Coltheart model with the shear-pin 
hypothesis is compromised by the model branding Factor 2 as a cognitive 
dysfunction. Factor 2 emerges as a deficit in belief evaluation—an inability 
to revise one’s existing beliefs in the face of disconfirming evidence. Due 
to such a deficit, the belief becomes resistant to counterevidence and is 
preserved. Factor 2 cannot be a shear-pin mechanism because it is 
characterised not as a design feature, but as a dysfunction, and thus the 
delusional belief cannot be regarded as adaptive.  
 
What we can say, then, is that the shear-pin hypothesis is incompatible 
with belief adoption in the Coltheart model, because belief adoption does 
not respond to a crisis, and could be compatible with belief maintenance in 
the Coltheart model if the delusion were not branded as the outcome of a 
dysfunction. The delusion would be a design feature which prevents the 
system from collapsing.  
 
3.2. The McKay Model and the Shear-pin Hypothesis 
 
We saw that McKay sees the delusion as irrationally formed, that is, as a 
non-optimal explanation of the anomalous data caused by Factor 1. The 
main difference with the Coltheart model is that Factor 2 gets activated at 
the belief adoption stage rather than at the maintenance stage. Thus, we 
need not distinguish between belief adoption stage and belief maintenance 
stage in the McKay model because both Factor 1 and Factor 2 operate at 
the belief adoption stage and the unusual belief qualifies as a delusion then.  
 
In the McKay model, then, do delusions (1) emerge in the context of a 
crisis and (2) rescue the cognitive system from collapsing? As with the 
Coltheart model, in the Capgras case the adoption of the delusion can 
hardly be interpreted as the response to a critical situation, and there seem 
to be no reason to believe that it would be rescuing the cognitive system 
from collapsing. Rather, the adoption of delusions is the outcome of a 
cognitive bias operating on anomalous data. When people with Capgras 
lack feelings of familiarity towards a familiar face, the cognitive system 
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produces a belief (“The woman in front of me is not my wife but is an 
impostor”) which is false, but “fits” those feelings.  
 
Can delusions more generally be seen as the output of a shear-pin 
mechanism in the McKay model? For the shear-pin hypothesis to apply, 
there needs to be a crisis the delusion is a response to (e.g., overwhelming 
negative emotions to manage) and this response prevents the cognitive 
system from collapsing. It is well known that unexplained anomalous 
experiences may generate uncertainty (Fineberg and Corlett 2016) and by 
providing an explanation of those experiences, delusions would contribute 
to relieve the ensuing anxiety. An example of a delusion that could be 
explained by the shear-pin hypothesis is the Reverse Othello syndrome 
(McKay et al. 2015). After recently becoming disabled, a man comes to 
believe that his previous partner is still in love with him and that they 
married, whereas his partner has moved on and is in another relationship. 
The realisation that his partner had left him on top of the many other 
changes caused by his new disability might have led the man to depression 
and even suicide, threatening the continued functioning of his cognitive 
system. In this case, it is easy to see how the shear-pin could intervene to 
avoid the collapse of the person’s cognitive system. The adoption of the 
delusion (e.g., “My partner and I still are in a happy relationship”) could 
be interpreted as a sign that the shear pin has broken: the man’s desires 
have been permitted to exercise a powerful influence on his beliefs (see 
also Mele 2006). In the instance of Reverse Othello syndrome examined 
by McKay (Butler 2000), the man then gradually abandoned the conviction 
in the delusional belief that his former partner still loved him and had 
become his wife which suggests that the delusion did not have long-term 
negative consequences for the man’s functioning. However, in an 
alternative hypothetical case in which the delusion persisted after the initial 
crisis had been managed, the delusion might have lost its adaptive role and 
become a serious hindrance. 
 
Our conclusion is that the shear-pin hypothesis is compatible with the 
McKay model, because the adoption of the delusion is not due to a 
cognitive dysfunction, and the delusion can in some contexts be formed as 
a response to a crisis that prevents the cognitive system from collapsing. 
That said, the Capgras would not a be a good example of a delusion that is 
the outcome of a shear-pin mechanism and even for other types of 
delusions for which the shear-pin hypothesis is more plausible, it is not 
clear that the psychological benefits of adopting the delusion outweigh the 
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3.3. Summary of Section 3 
 
The two models of the two-factor theory we are discussing do not explicitly 
address the question whether delusions are adaptive, although Ryan 
McKay has considered the question elsewhere (McKay and Dennett 2009). 
It is an interesting issue, though, whether the two-factor theory is 
compatible with the claim that delusions are adaptive at least in the short-
term, a claim that is not implausible for at least some delusions in some 
contexts.   
 
We argued that the McKay model can make room for a shear-pin 
explanation of the adaptive nature of some delusions, whereas for the 
Coltheart model things get trickier (see table 3). We also observed that the 
overall plausibility of claims about delusional beliefs being adaptive 
cannot be generalised and depends on the content of the delusional belief 
and the context in which it emerges. 
 
 
Delusions as adaptive outputs of a shear-pin breakage 
The Coltheart Model 
(Coltheart et al. 2010) 
The maintenance of the delusion in the face of 
counterevidence could be a response to a crisis that 
prevents the cognitive system from collapsing so it could 
be due to a shear-pin breakage. However, this is not 
compatible with the belief being the outcome of a 
cognitive dysfunction. 
 
The McKay Model 
(McKay 2012) 
The adoption of some delusions is a response to a crisis 
that prevents the cognitive system from collapsing so it 
could be due to a shear-pin breakage. This is compatible 
with those delusions being the outcome of a cognitive 
bias. 
Table 3: Are delusions adaptive? 
 
 
4. Conclusions and Implications 
 
We asked what two influential models of the two-factor theory of delusion 
formation have to say about the potential pathological nature and 
adaptiveness of delusions, with a special focus on monothematic delusions 
such as Capgras. Throughout, we made some observations which have 
implications for further investigations into the nature of delusions.  
 
First, delusions can be pathological on a normativist reading of disorder, 
where delusions simply need to be harmful to count as pathological, 
although it is not clear that delusions are always the source of harm as 
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opposed to a response to an existing crisis that causes harm (Bortolotti 
2015). Some delusions may enable the person to cope with adversities and 
preserve their self-esteem (Gunn and Bortolotti 2018). In one case, Barbara 
started believing that God was communicating with her by telepathic 
messages because she was his child and she was good: “as God was talking 
to me he was making sure that I knew there was nothing wrong with me. 
And he’s always there, whether I’m right, whether I’m wr… well, he, he 
says I’m never wrong, God says I’m never wrong”. Barbara developed the 
delusion after hearing voices for some time and her delusional belief may 
be considered as an explanation for her unusual experiences. Furthermore, 
Barbara’s belief that she was special and that God was supporting her 
followed a very difficult time in her life, when her unfaithful husband had 
left her permanently and she was feeling both vulnerable and guilty about 
earlier decisions she made in her life. In the short term, the delusion might 
have protected Barbara from negative feelings about herself and prevented 
a suicidal attempt which was on her mind. 
 
It is even more dubious that we can base the pathological nature of 
delusions on a naturalist or harmful-dysfunction reading of disorder, where 
delusions need to be the outcome of a dysfunctional process to count as 
pathological. That is because we cannot easily show that the cognitive 
process responsible for delusion formation is a dysfunctional process in 
itself as opposed to a cognitive process that operates in non-ideal 
conditions (such as a process whose input is the outcome of a dysfunction, 
a process affected by biases or performance errors, etc.).  
 
Second, whether delusions are the outcome of a shear-pin breakage is also 
very difficult to ascertain in general terms. It is possible that a shear-pin 
mechanism works to protect a person’s cognitive functioning by relieving 
that person from the anxiety which comes with anomalous experiences, 
helping the person manage negative emotions, or salvaging the person’s 
positive self-image. However, whether the alleged benefits ever outweigh, 
even temporarily, the costs of having the delusion is by no means obvious 
and needs further examination. Some progress could be made with the 
issue whether delusions are psychologically adaptive if it were possible to 
compare the psychological profile of people with delusions with the 
psychological profile of people who have the same experiences as people 
with delusions but develop no delusions. If delusions are an emergency 
response which is devised to help in the face of a crisis, then people facing 
the same crisis as people with delusions but with no delusions should be 
psychologically worse off. This would help clarify if delusions are the 
problem or the imperfect solution to a problem (Lancellotta forthcoming). 
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Finally, one interesting upshot of our investigation is that in a version of 
the two-factor theory of delusions the same belief can be adaptive and 
pathological (though not at the same time). This marks an important 
difference between the Coltheart model and the McKay model. In the 
McKay model, some delusions can prevent the person’s cognitive system 
from breaking down at the time of their adoption (and thus be adaptive as 
the outcome of a shear-pin breakage) and disrupt the person’s 
psychological functioning in the long-term (and thus count as pathological 
on a normativist account). However, in the Coltheart model, delusions 
cannot be adaptive and pathological, because by being the outcome of a 
dysfunctional process and counting as pathological in a naturalist and 
harmful-dysfunction sense, the possibility that they are also the outcome 
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